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The Sutherland Report and the Theory of WTO Law 
 
By Chi Carmody1 
 
 
The recent report of the Consultative Board to the WTO Director-General, referred to as 
the Sutherland Report, deals with a number of key issues in the present and future of 
WTO. Among them are globalization, non-discrimination, sovereignty, coherence, and 
dispute settlement. We can legitimately wonder what motivated this selection. After all, 
the WTO Agreement involves many issues. A casual review of the Sutherland Report 
might suggest that the Consultative Board simply chose those issues that have been the 
most politically sensitive for the organization and focused upon them.  
 
Looked at more closely, however, something else becomes apparent. This is that there is 
a common thread to most of the issues dealt with in the Sutherland Report and that they 
can be understood in an integrated manner according to a theory of WTO law. The 
Consultative Board may not have expressed its findings and recommendations in such 
terms, but there should be little doubt that its work was motivated by a belief in legal 
principle. 
 
This is an important insight, chiefly because most theories of the WTO as a treaty and an 
international institution come to us from either economics or politics. We are apt to 
regard the WTO Agreement’s shape and operation as attributable to comparative 
advantage or power relations, or perhaps some combination of the two. The idea that 
there exists a coherent theory of WTO law seems somewhat suspect. 
 
A number of factors reinforce such an attitude. One is the complexity of the WTO 
Agreement, a document which in its official version runs more than 26,000 pages and 
which contains a large number of obligations, not all of which fit together neatly. Simply 
put, the treaty is so big and unkempt that it often defies the legal imagination. 
 
Another factor is WTO dispute settlement. Because the WTO Agreement is so complex, 
countries have been forced to litigate their disputes over interpretation of the treaty in 
dispute settlement. The process works reasonably well, but litigation does not always 
raise underlying principles of WTO law in the most comprehensive or consistent manner.  
 
Still another factor is public perception. As the Consultative Board pointed out, the WTO 
is often seen through the prism of national concerns. “Members understandably portray 
the WTO in terms of domestic political preoccupations” it noted, “seldom on the basis of 
the principles that underlie the system.”2 Such a partisan perspective tends to neglect the 
treaty’s core values. 
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2 The Consultative Board to the Director-General, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium 
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That core begins with the realization the WTO is not concerned with trade per se, but 
rather with the protection of expectations about the trade-related behaviour of 
governments. This principle has been recognized in WTO dispute settlement on many 
occasions and was acknowledged by the Consultative Board in the Sutherland Report as 
follows: 
 
The WTO is about providing opportunities – it does not provide 
guarantees nor does it provide all the conditions for participation in the 
global economy. In essence it says to governments: here are a set of 
market opportunities for your local firms or individuals, if they are 
competitive, could benefit from; here also are the rules under which they 
will operate in foreign markets and under which others must be allowed to 
operate in your market.3 
 
The emphasis on expectations goes on to explain the Consultative Board’s preoccupation 
with the erosion of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle. MFN requires that all 
WTO members extend their most favourable trading concessions and commitments to all 
other WTO members “immediately and unconditionally”. In essence, it assures that all 
WTO members have the same expectation of access to the domestic market of a member 
country. The Consultative Board rightly described it as being “at the heart of GATT” and 
as its “central organizing rule”.4 
 
At the same time, the Consultative Board admitted that “nearly five decades after the 
founding of the GATT, MFN is no longer the rule; it is almost the exception.”5 In its 
place “a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of customs unions, common market, regional and bilateral free 
trade areas, preferences and an endless assortment of miscellaneous trade deals” has 
arisen. The trend is of concern because it detracts from the uniformity of MFN and 
therefore from the uniformity of expectations. Some recommitment to this principle is 
required, the Consultative Board implied, and that it should do so is hardly surprising. 
MFN is the lynchpin of the system. 
 
However, recommitment to MFN is challenging for a number of reasons. One is the 
impact that a recommitment might have on the practice of WTO decision-making by 
consensus, the procedural equivalent of MFN.6 The Consultative Board appeared to 
appreciate the difficulty of calling for the reinforcement of MFN without a parallel 
reinforcement of consensus decision-making, currently the source of much paralysis in 
the WTO’s operation. Probably as a consequence, the Sutherland Report’s 
recommendation was relatively tempered on this vital point.7 
 
                                                 
3 The Future, para. 45. 
4 The Future, para. 58. 
5 The Future, para. 60. 
6 The Future, para. 281. 
7 With respect to consensus decision-making the Consultative Board recommended only that the WTO General Council adopt a 
Declaration that a WTO member considering blocking a measure which otherwise enjoys broad support should only be allowed to 
block the consensus if it declares in writing that the matter is one of vital national interest and supply reasons for its decision. See The 
Future, Recommendation 25. 
 3 
A similar explanation could be given for the Consultative Board’s cool attitude towards 
“variable geometry”, or the idea that WTO obligations should differ for different 
members of the organization. Variable geometry is to countenance a WTO à plusieurs 
vitesses, something antithetic to the uniformity of MFN and yet, given the ‘spaghetti 
bowl’ mentioned above, arguably only a recognition of the prevailing state of affairs. 
Again, the Sutherland Report was cautious on this point.  
 
A further difficulty with recommitment to MFN is the oft-expressed concern that the 
uniformity of “pure” MFN does not take adequate account of real world conditions in 
many developing countries. On this subject the Consultative Board took something of a 
mixed view. It referred to special and differential treatment for developing countries 
under the treaty as a potential trap, quoting from a 1990 study that “in the more rapidly 
growing [developing] economies, such as Korea; Chinese, Taipei; Turkey and others, 
there is little evidence that special and differential treatment has played much of a role in 
their strong performance.”8 Nevertheless, the Consultative Board was prepared to 
concede that “there is a strong case to be made that least-developed countries should have 
a contractual entitlement to capacity building support to implement new commitments in 
the WTO.”9 
 
Each of the foregoing points illustrates the fact that, to some degree, the WTO Agreement 
involves more than more than simply the protection of ex ante expectations. Such 
protection can be seen as a base or “first position”, but here and there under the treaty are 
rules that exist to allow governments to respond to ex post realities. While aware of the 
fundamental need to protect expectations about conditions as they might be, the treaty 
thus also takes into account certain conditions as they actually are. WTO disciplines on 
safeguards, certain types of subsidies and anti-dumping action can be said to fall in this 
second category. Such obligations are based on actual conditions and are more likely to 
involve real trade flows. 
 
The distinction reveals a subtle tension in the treaty, something alluded to by the 
Consultative Board when it observes that “[n]either the WTO nor the GATT was ever an 
unrestricted free trade charter.” In the Consultative Board’s view: 
 
… both were and are intended to provide a structural and functionally 
effective way to harness the value of open trade to principle and fairness. 
In doing so they offer security and predictability of market access 
advantages that are sought by traders and investors. But the rules provide 
checks and balances, including mechanisms that reflect political realism as 
well as free trade doctrine. It is not that the WTO disallows market 
protection, only that it sets some strict disciplines under which 
governments may choose to respond to special interests.10 
 
                                                 
8 The Future, para. 99. 
9 The Future, para. 306. 
10 The Future, para. 39. 
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Again, the Consultative Board’s observations must be examined with care, but they 
appear to acknowledge that the treaty is something of a hybrid. The content of its legal 
rules is dictated by the need to accommodate both aspiration and reality. 
 
The treaty’s double aspect reveals something else too. This is about the nature of justice 
under the WTO Agreement. Classically there are two forms of justice: corrective and 
distributive.11 Corrective justice applies to private property and plays a rectificatory role 
in transactions. Thus, when a person is wrongfully deprived of their property they are 
entitled to have it returned or to be compensated. The implicit metric is equality: you get 
what you’ve lost. Distributive justice, by comparison, applies to the distribution of public 
goods such as “honour or money or other things that have to be shared among members 
of the political community.”12 It presupposes some socially agreed means of allotment. 
Consequently, the implicit metric is proportionate: you get what you’re entitled to. 
 
As matters now stand, justice under the WTO Agreement involves member countries 
taking each other before three-person panels where there is an alleged violation of the 
treaty. When the complaint is made out, the panel normally recommends that the offender 
bring its law “into conformity” with the WTO Agreement. Thereafter, if the parties 
cannot settle the matter, they may negotiate compensation among themselves as a 
temporary measure pending compliance or, as a “last resort”, the plaintiff may seek 
authorization to retaliate by suspending concessions, again pending compliance. What 
kind of justice does this represent? 
 
WTO rules concerning dispute settlement suggest that the nature of justice under the 
WTO Agreement is primarily distributive. Distributive justice explains why it is that the 
principal remedy under the WTO Agreement is a mere recommendation of conformity: in 
classic distributive fashion the recommendation insists on a return to conformity, thereby 
re-establishing the distribution of expectations. Distributive justice also explains why 
WTO remedies focus on prospective as opposed to retrospective relief: their aim is not so 
much to repair prior or existing damage as it is to re-establish expectations in future. 
Finally, distributive justice explains why the ultimate sanction in the system is the 
suspension of concessions: suspension effectively denies the wrongdoer their 
proportionate share of the system’s benefit. 
 
Nevertheless, distributive justice is not the whole story of justice under the WTO 
Agreement. Our observation that the treaty has an expectation-based and reality-based 
aspect to it is paralleled by a similar tension between distributive and corrective justice. 
Distributive justice is the dominant form of justice under the treaty, but an impulse 
towards corrective justice subsists, both because several WTO obligations give the 
appearance of corrective justice and because corrective justice appeals to our innate sense 
of what justice should be. For instance, a wrongfully levied anti-dumping duty raises 
calls for its return, even though the amount of the duty will have little to do with the 
breached expectations and is not commonly considered refundable under WTO law. 
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Such a situation might well explain why the Consultative Board expressed concern with 
ongoing retaliation. Retaliation is a deviation from a theory of WTO law that plainly 
emphasizes conformity as a means of protecting expectations. Indeed, at some point it 
can begin to look a lot like corrective justice. The Consultative Board noted its concern in 
this regard, observing that the persistence of retaliation in a few high-profile cases has 
tended to confer an aura of legitimacy upon it: 
 
The somewhat relaxed, even complacent, resort to such damaging trade 
action is becoming serious. Also, there are worries, in particular, that some 
countries, including some of the major trading partners, such as the U.S. 
and the EU, are acting in a recalcitrant manner, and not taking measures 
that would effectively, and in a timely manner, fulfill their obligations.13 
 
The Consultative Board was similarly critical of suggestions to make compensation more 
automatic or to permit the recoupment of legal fees in WTO dispute settlement, observing 
that: 
 
To allow governments to “buy out” of their obligations by providing 
“compensation” or enduring “suspension of obligation” also creates major 
asymmetries of treatment in the system. It favors the rich and powerful 
countries which can afford such “buy outs” while retaining measures that 
harm or distort trade in a manner inconsistent with the rules of the 
system.14 
 
The Consultative Board concluded that: 
 
[s]ome experimentation in this regard could be useful, but great care must 
be exercised to be sure that monetary compensation is only a temporary 
fallback approach pending full compliance, otherwise the “buy out” 
problems will occur.15 
 
One could, of course, ascribe significance to the Consultative Board’s conclusions here 
since any acknowledgment of the option to “contract out” of WTO obligations might be 
construed as an endorsement of a fundamentally different view of the treaty. There may 
be some truth to that view. Again, however, we have to remember how limited and 
cautious the Consultative Board’s pronouncement was on this point. Elsewhere the Board 
repeatedly reminded its audience that “it is extremely important that the major players 
follow a policy of conforming to the obligations outlined in WTO panel and Appellate 
Body reports in cases brought against them.”16 The call to conformity would appear to 
reinforce a more traditional view of the WTO system. 
 
                                                 
13 The Future, para. 240. 
14 The Future, para. 242. 
15 The Future, para. 243. 
16 The Future, para. 245. 
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In sum, the Consultative Board’s conclusions can be regarded as the manifestation of a 
theory of WTO law. That theory may not always be readily apparent. There are many 
things going on under the treaty at once: the protection of expectations, the 
accommodation to realities, and possibly even their integration together in some third, 
and overarching, interest.17 As a result the total picture frequently looks confusing. 
 
What is useful about thinking as we have here, however, is that it permits us to 
comprehend what has previously appeared almost incomprehensible. Documents like the 
Sutherland Report become understandable as reflections not only of political and 
economic priorities, but also of legal principle. And as the Consultative Board itself 
pointed out, “[t]hose principles are little known, yet as valid and valuable now as when 







                                                 
17 The interests mentioned here replicate those identified in the classic article by L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance 
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936), and now incorporated in the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (2nd) §344 (1981). 
The contractual matrix in which these interests are identified is noteworthy in light of the Sutherland Report’s many references to the 
contractualism of WTO obligations. See for instance “contractual requirements of membership” (para. 3), “the contractual detail of 
the WTO” (para. 200), “an institution founded on negotiated contractual commitments among governments” (para. 206), “countries 
should have contractual entitlement to capacity building support” (para. 306), “the WTO, in future, should contain provisions for a 
contractual right” (para. 311).   
18 The Future, para. 362. 
